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THE DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOWS:
REVERSE-ERIE, ITS CASES, ITS
THEORIES, AND ITS FUTURE WITH
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING IN
ALASKA
Philip A. Tarpley*
ABSTRACT
In 2007 and 2009, respectively, the United States Supreme Court decided
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, abrogated Conley
v. Gibson’s notice pleading standard, and imposed a new plausibility
pleading standard upon the federal court system. Alaska, along with a
majority of states however, still retains Conley’s “no set of facts” notice
pleading standard. This Note asks, in light of the difference between the
federal and Alaska pleading standards, whether Alaska—or any state—could
be forced to apply the federal pleading standard when it adjudicates federal
substantive claims. Prior to Iqbal, a plaintiff in Alaska would have faced the
same pleading obligations in state and federal court regardless of whether he
pleaded a state or federal claim. As this Note describes, now, a plaintiff could
face different pleading standards depending on not only where he brings his
claim, but also, if he’s in state court, whether he brings a state or federal
claim. The reason for this is the Reverse-Erie doctrine: an little-developed
judicial choice of law theory that broadly asks which procedure, federal or
state, applies in a state court proceeding. Using the differences between
federal and state pleading standards as an opportunity to flesh out ReverseErie, this Note concludes that while it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would force a state to adopt the federal pleading standard, the jurisprudential
framework for such a move exists.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 18, 1957, the United States Supreme Court handed
down Conley v. Gibson1 and ushered in an era of notice pleading. Though
initially only federal in application, Conley’s interpretation of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) soon swept across the nation.
Throughout the next half-century, state after state adopted Conley’s
liberalized notice pleading standard. In 1940, Arizona’s Supreme Court
adopted the Federal Rules verbatim, making Arizona the first federal
replica state—”that is, a state with a procedural system modeled after
the Federal Rules.”2 In 1959, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted its own
set of procedural rules modeled after the Federal Rules.3 In 1967, that
court adopted Conley’s interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) and incorporated
the federal notice pleading standard.4 By 1975, twenty-one other states
had followed Arizona’s and Alaska’s examples and become federal
replica states.5 By 2007, fifty years after Conley was decided, twenty-six
states and the District of Columbia had altered their procedural rules to
resemble the Federal Rules.6
On May 21, 2007 and May 18, 2009, respectively, the United States
Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly7 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,8 abrogating Conley’s notice pleading standard and imposing a new
plausibility pleading standard upon the federal courts.9 These decisions
shook the foundation for those states, like Alaska, that had adopted the
federal pleading rule using the Conley standard. After Twombly and Iqbal,
state courts had to decide whether to follow the Supreme Court and
change from notice to plausibility pleading or stick to the Conley “no set
1. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
2. Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1437 (2008).
3. See 2014-15 Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, ALASKA COURT SYS.,
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/rules/civ2.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(showing that most of the rules were “adopted by [Supreme Court Order] 5
October 9, 1959”).
4. Shannon v. Anchorage, 429 P.2d 17, 19 (Alaska 1967). See id. at 21
(Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46) (“Adopting this last
mentioned line of authorities, and treating the matter as a motion for summary
judgment, I am of the opinion that it does not appear ‘beyond doubt’ that
appellant could prove ‘no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.”).
5. John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Court, 3 NEV. L.J.
354, 356–58 (2003).
6. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
8. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
9. Id. at 678.
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of facts” standard. This question was especially daunting for states, like
Alaska, that had functioned under Conley’s pleading standard for
decades.
Two recent state supreme court decisions have thrown this
question into the forefront of civil procedure discussions. In 2010, the
Washington Supreme Court handed down McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank,
FSB10 and became the first state supreme court to reject the new
plausibility pleading standard.11 One year later, the Tennessee Supreme
Court joined Washington when it decided Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat
for Humanity, Inc.12 As time draws on, more states will be forced to
answer this question for themselves. Alaska will certainly be faced with
this decision. Though a replica state, the Alaska court system has yet to
address Twombly and Iqbal. As it stands today, Alaska courts still apply
Conley’s notice pleading requirement to the federal and state claims that
pass in front of them.13
This issue has substantial implications for all stages of litigation.
“Pleading comes early in the life cycle of a case, shapes litigation
strategy, reveals valuable information to the opposing party (that can be
used to encourage settlements), and is the gateway to all subsequent
procedural devices.”14 For pro se litigants in particular, pleading is their
first exposure to the court system. The accessibility of the court system
can dramatically affect both the outcome of the litigant’s case and their
willingness to file a claim. And, unlike certain procedures that only
affect particular cases, pleading standards affect every case brought in
court. In Alaska, that means over 150,000 cases annually.15
In light of Twombly and Iqbal, this Note intends to answer the
question of which procedure—federal or state—must apply in an Alaska
state court adjudication of a federal substantive claim when Congress,
the Constitution, and the Courts have remained silent on this issue. The
consequences of this question’s answer are crucial to discussions of the
federal/state balance of power. The jurisprudential doctrine at work,
Reverse-Erie,16 is little known, rarely documented, and relatively
10. 233 P.3d 861 (Wash. 2010).
11. Id. at 863.
12. 346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011).
13. See, e.g., Ex rel. Mickelsen v. North-Wend Foods, Inc., 274 P.3d 1193, 1197
(Alaska 2012) (applying the Conley standard).
14. Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split
Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111 (2010).
15. Alaska Court System Annual Report FY 2013, ALASKA COURT SYS. 71 (2014),
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/reports/annualrep-fy13.pdf.
16. This doctrine is also known as “Converse-Erie” or “Inverse-Erie.” Joseph
R. Oliveri, Converse-Erie, The Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative
State, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372, 1373 (2008); Gregory Gelfand & Howard B.
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obscure. As Justice O’Connor commented in 1988, “the implications of
this ‘reverse-Erie’ theory [are not] quite clear.”17 Her comment is an
understatement. Most of the legal scholarship to touch upon the subject
has done so only briefly and in minor detail.18 This Note attempts to
change that. Here, each of the notable Reverse-Erie cases and the
theories they demonstrate will be put on full display.
Ultimately, the answer to the question of which procedural law—
federal or state—must apply in state court is unclear. Though it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever force the heightened
plausibility pleading standard onto the states that have not adopted it,
the jurisprudential framework exists for such a move to be made.
Consequently, the Alaska Supreme Court, and all of the courts in states
that still apply Conley, should keep their ears to the ground on this
matter.
The advent of plausibility pleading and the question it poses to
state courts, however, presents an opportunity for constitutional law
scholars to more clearly understand Reverse-Erie. For the last century,
the Reverse-Erie doctrine has hidden in the shadows of Erie itself, as well
as federalism, pre-emption, and other monolithic constitutional
doctrines. Now, as states start to assert their own local procedural
dominance, Reverse-Erie has a chance to stand in the light of day. Most
importantly, this situation may eventually provide the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to apply Reverse-Erie to an essential aspect of civil
procedure that touches every case across the nation: pleading standards.
Part I of this Note introduces and explains the current pleading
situation. Part II explains the fundamental question of the Note. Part III
delves into the Reverse-Erie doctrine, explaining the theories it
represents, the cases that develop those theories, and the current state of
Reverse-Erie jurisprudence. Part IV builds off of the information in Parts
I–III to answer the question of which procedure—federal or state—must
apply in an Alaska state court adjudication of a federal substantive
claim.

I.
A.

THE CURRENT PLEADING SITUATION

The Federal Pleading Standard—Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal
In 1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act (REA)19 and

Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 941 n.76 (1988).
17. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
18. See infra notes 69–80.
19. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28
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opened the door to a new era of civil procedure in the United States.
Four years later, under the authority granted to it in the REA, the
Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), a
set of procedural rules that govern federal courts across the nation.20 The
FRCP fundamentally “reshaped civil procedure.”21 Today, the passage
of the FRCP is largely understood as “the single most substantial
procedural reform in U.S. history.”22
Among its many significant changes, the FRCP included a pleading
requirement in Rule 8. Under Rule 8(a)(2), all that is needed to
sufficiently construct a federal claim is “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”23 Rule 8 becomes
important when the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings is called into
question. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss “for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted”24 under Rule 12(b)(6), for
example, the court must determine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
pleadings.
The Court has interpreted and explained Rule 8(a)(2) in response to
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In Conley v. Gibson,25 the Court adopted a
notice pleading standard. “[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim.”26 Rather, a complaint simply must contain enough information
to provide notice of the crux of the claim. Under Conley, “a complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief.”27 For the rest of the twentieth
century, Conley’s “no set of facts” language “became a cornerstone of
federal civil procedure.”28 But this era of notice pleading—an era the
Court had rigorously protected29—did not last.

U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
20. Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 229, 232–33 (1998).
21. Id. at 233.
22. Id. at 248.
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
25. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
26. Id. at 47.
27. Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added).
28. Michalski, supra note 14, at 115.
29. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002)
(defending and enforcing the notice pleading standard against lower courts’
more strict interpretations of Rule 8); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that different
pleading standards “must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
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With Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 in 2007 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal31 in
2009, the Supreme Court abrogated Conley’s notice pleading—sending
shockwaves throughout the legal community in the process.32 In
Twombly, a Sherman Antitrust Act33 case, the Court changed pleadings
from merely requiring notice to requiring “plausibility.”34 Two years
later, the Court returned to the plausibility pleading standard in Iqbal.
There, the Court applied the new plausibility pleading standard to all
federal claims, as opposed to just antitrust suits, and overruled Conley in
the process.35
In federal court, merely providing notice is no longer sufficient to
survive dismissal. Plaintiffs must now allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”36 More specifically, to avoid
dismissal under 12(b)(6), plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”37
Commentators have closely scrutinized the impact of the
plausibility pleading standard. Many fear that, contrary to the words of
the Court,38 the pleading standard had in fact been heightened and had
become less plaintiff-friendly. In the words of one commentator, federal
pleading had become “a significant veto-gate through which all claims
must pass.”39
B.

The Federal and State Responses to the Federal Rules and
Plausibility Pleading

Prior to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the FRCP, state and
federal courts employed a hodgepodge of pleading standards.40 Part of
the impetus for the FRCP was to fix this problem. Indeed, the desire for
procedural uniformity within federal courts played a central role in the

Rules, and not by judicial interpretation”).
30. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
31. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
32. A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, PLEADING IN STATE COURTS AFTER TWOMBLY AND
IQBAL 2 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038349.
33. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7
(2012)).
34. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
35. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
36. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
37. Id.
38. See id. (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics . . . .”).
39. Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 161 (2010).
40. Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing
a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (2005).
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movement to adopt the FRCP.41 After their passage, the FRCP were
hailed as “a triumph of uniformity over localism.”42 Though adopted
with broad appeal, the FRCP could only, by definition, apply to the
federal courts. The states, however, did not ignore the change. In 1940,
Arizona’s Supreme Court adopted the FRCP verbatim, making Arizona
the first federal replica state—”that is, a state with a procedural system
modeled after the Federal Rules.”43 By 1975, twenty-three states had
become federal replica states.44 By 2007, when Twombly was decided,
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had altered their
procedural rules to resemble the FRCP.45 And many states that did not
model their rules exactly after the Federal Rules still looked to the FRCP
for guidance.46
Unfortunately, the push towards national procedural uniformity
has since slowed, if not reversed.47 Many reasons have been cited, but
perhaps the most compelling is that unique local concerns have weighed
heavily on the minds of state judges.48 State judges have increasingly
asserted these local concerns, including “discovery abuse, expense and
delay, excessive judicial power and discretion, excessive court
rulemaking, unpredictability, litigiousness, an overly adversarial
atmosphere, unequal resources of parties, lack of focus, and formal
adjudication itself.”49 Citing these concerns and others, certain state
courts have become less willing to follow the federal courts’ example.50
Recall that the replica states, following the Supreme Court’s lead,

41. Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules:
A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (2001).
42. Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Freidman, The Fragmentation of Federal
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995).
43. Chen, supra note 2, at 1437.
44. Oakley, supra note 5, at 356–58.
45. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
46. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Comment on the Federalism of the Federal Rules,
28 DUKE L.J. 843, 843 (1979). (“Well over half the states now have civil rules
closely patterned after the [FRCP], and movement toward adoption of federalmodel rules continues in at least some way in the other states.” (footnote
omitted)).
47. Oakley, supra note 5, at 355.
48. Michalski, supra note 14, at 113.
49. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 911–12 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
50. See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d
422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) (declining to adopt the new plausibility standard in state
court); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010)
(same).
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had adopted the Conley “no set of facts” liberal notice pleading standard.
After the Court’s adoption of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal,
these courts, in addition to those in non-replica states, have the
opportunity to reevaluate their own procedural systems. “Iqbal thus
creates a tension between the desire of some states to achieve uniformity
with federal courts and the desire to follow the same standard as other
states.”51

II. THE QUESTION
Federal and state courts face different procedural obligations. In
federal court, federal procedure takes precedence—it applies, in large
part, in both subject matter and diversity jurisdiction cases; when a
Federal Rule governs the matter, the Federal Rule applies.52 Therefore,
regardless of whether the court adjudicates a federal or state substantive
claim, there is no procedural uniformity concern. State courts, in
contrast, are faced with a slightly different situation. In state court, state
procedures always apply to state substantive claims.53 When the state
court adjudicates federal substantive claims, however, the Supremacy
Clause comes into play.54 Consequently, the situation is not nearly so
clear. As discussed in Part III, sometimes state procedure applies and
other times federal procedure applies.
This presents an intriguing set of scenarios. If a state had replicated
the Federal Rules in all cases and incorporated plausibility pleading
across the board, theoretically there would be pure procedural
uniformity for both state and federal courts applying both state and
federal substantive law. But if a state retains its own set of civil
procedures, the procedure applied in state and federal adjudications, as
well as between federal adjudications of state and federal substantive
law, will differ. For advocates of uniformity, this second scenario is
clearly less desirable.
The above scenarios are premised upon a state’s ability to choose
its own procedure. But, as is discussed below, that premise is not

51. Michalski, supra note 14, at 114.
52. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.
393, 398 (2010).
53. See, e.g., Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 430 (“Although federal judicial decisions
‘interpreting rules similar to our own are persuasive authority for purposes of
construing the Tennessee rule,’ they ‘are non-binding even when the state and
federal rules are identical.’” (quoting Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 745 n.2
(Tenn. 2000))).
54. Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2006).
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certain.55 And, were a state forced to implement federal procedure in
certain cases, a much more complex scenario would arise: two systems
of procedure would exist in both state and federal court adjudications—
one for state law substantive claims, another for federal substantive law
claims. For those preaching uniformity, this would be a disaster.56
Unfortunately for uniformity-advocates, this latter scenario is
gaining traction. Through a variety of cases, the Supreme Court has
imposed federal procedure upon certain state court adjudications of
federal substantive law.57 The theory at the foundation of this
development, Reverse-Erie, has been largely unexplored.
The general formulation of the question this Note seeks to
answer—the heart of Reverse-Erie—is therefore, “which procedure—
federal or state—must apply in an Alaska state court adjudication of a
federal substantive claim when Congress, the Constitution, and the
Courts have remained silent on this issue?” The more specific form asks
this same question but with regards to pleading standards in particular.
As states, including Alaska, now evaluate whether to change their
pleading standards,58 Reverse-Erie, while obscure, may, if the answer to
the question asked is that federal procedures must apply, have serious
consequences. In certain cases, Alaska state courts may be obligated to
use the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal59 rather than the “no set
of facts” standard currently in effect.
As “[p]leading comes early in the life cycle of a case, shapes
litigation strategy, reveals valuable information to the opposing party
(that can be used to encourage settlements), and is the gateway to all
subsequent procedural devices,”60 its significance cannot be
underestimated. The logistics of procedural rule changes aside, the
imposition of federal procedure in state court adjudication carries with it
concerns of federalism and the balance of power between the state and
federal court systems.

55. See infra Part IV.
56. Of course, for advocates of broad federalism, the same situation could be
utopic.
57. See infra Part III.
58. See Michalski, supra note 14, at 109 (“In the months and years to come,
other states will face the dilemma [of whether to change their rules or not].”).
59. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
60. Michalski, supra note 14, at 111.
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III. REVERSE-ERIE
A.

The Doctrine

In 1938, the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.61
This was seemingly a narrow decision—answering only a single
question of which substantive law, federal or state, applied in certain
federal court proceedings.62 However, Erie went on to spawn decades of
litigation, the cumulative result of which has come to be known as the
Erie Doctrine. The Erie Doctrine encompasses, on its face, a judicial
choice-of-law methodology, “commonly understood to embrace all
situations in which [a federal] court must choose between federal or
state law.”63 Sprawling across thousands of cumulative pages in
casebooks and law student outlines, and across hundreds of court
opinions and law review articles, the Erie Doctrine stands, in the words
of Justice Harlan, as “one of the modern cornerstones of our
federalism”64—a way for the judiciary to balance the scales of power
between state and federal governments. For the purposes of this Note,
however, it suffices to describe the doctrine as the narrow answer Erie
itself addressed: which law, federal or state, applies in a federal court
proceeding.
Given the Erie Doctrine’s prominence, it may seem odd that it has
been described as merely “a false front on a movie set,”65 and only “the
opposite side of the federalism coin.”66 Behind the traditional Erie
Doctrine’s fake front (or on its other side, depending on your metaphor
of choice) looms a similar, yet distinct, question. This question broadly
asks which law, federal or state, applies in a state court proceeding.67
Theoretically, the answer to this question (“Reverse-Erie”) has the
potential to have as much of an impact, if not greater, on the judicial
system than its traditional cousin. While the Erie Doctrine applies only
in federal court—a judicial system of limited jurisdiction—Reverse-Erie
applies in state courts—judicial systems of extremely broad jurisdiction.
As one scholar has commented, Reverse-Erie “seems to pose a question
at least as important as Erie—and in fact numerically far more significant

61. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
62. Id. at 69.
63. Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and
Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L.
REV. 611, 612 n.2 (2007).
64. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
65. Clermont, supra note 54, at 2.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 2.
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because, as everybody knows, the volume of business in state courts
dwarfs that in federal courts.”68
Unfortunately, unlike the Erie Doctrine, this Reverse-Erie Doctrine
is not nearly as ubiquitous as its traditional counterpart. In fact, in a 2006
survey of law school casebooks, Cornell Law Professor Kevin M.
Clermont noted that, while all eighteen mainstream civil procedure
casebooks cover the Erie Doctrine,69 (devoting an average of sixty-three
pages to it),70 seven casebooks avoid the Reverse-Erie Doctrine entirely,71
three mention it only in passing,72 three mention its bare bones73 and
only five afford any sort of serious attention to it,74 all devoting fewer
than ten pages to the doctrine.75 Even more remarkably, out of the eight
current mainstream federal courts casebooks examined by Professor
Clermont, three do not address the topic at all,76 four mention it with a
glancing, secondary focus77 and only one devotes serious attention to
it.78 “While everyone has an Erie theory and stands ready to debate it,”
Professor Clermont lamented, “almost no one has a theory of [R]everseErie, and no one at all has developed a clear choice-of-law methodology
for it.”79 For something that is “often misunderstood, mischaracterized,
and misapplied by judges and commentators,” it is strange that most
scholars ignore it completely.80
There is, however, ample reason for both this lack of attention and
the confusion surrounding the doctrine. First, although it may be
tantalizing to call Reverse-Erie the mirror image of Erie,81 Reverse-Erie
actually poses a distinct question:82 to what extent do state courts, when

68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 50 n.198.
70. Id. at 50.
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id. at 51 n.199.
73. Id. at 51 n.200.
74. Id. at 51 n.201.
75. Id. at 51.
76. Id. at 53 n.209.
77. Id. at 53 n.210.
78. Id. at 54 n.211.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to
Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L.
REV. 71, 100 (1998) (referring to Reverse-Erie cases as “the mirror-image of the
situation involved in the Court’s famed decision in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins”).
82. See Clermont, supra note 54, at 4 (“Reverse-Erie [asks] . . . [i]n state court,
when does state law apply and when does federal law apply? By this
formulation, reverse-Erie poses a question very similar to the Erie question—
although tantalizingly, it does not have an identical answer.”).
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adjudicating substantive federal rights, have to use federal procedures
in lieu of state procedures?83 Second, this specific question is rarely
addressed. There are very few cases that touch upon Reverse-Erie in any
meaningful way. The cases that do exist are, unfortunately, spread
widely throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, each case follows a
different approach on how to resolve the Reverse-Erie question.84
Additionally, remarkably few law review articles have addressed
Reverse-Erie.85 Those that have addressed the doctrine have not agreed
on how to interpret the case law.86 Third, Reverse-Erie touches upon
several different and substantial legal doctrines, many of which are wellknown and within which it is easy to get lost in the concepts discussed
and language used: conflict-of-law,87 commandeering,88 pre-emption,89
the Supremacy Clause,90 and the related doctrine of Testa v. Katt,91 to
name a few. The use of such concepts and language in Reverse-Erie
scholarship usually results in a mixed terminology, increased confusion,
and decreased clarity.
Our knowledge of the Reverse-Erie problem stems from the few
Supreme Court cases to touch upon the doctrine. Unfortunately, while
state courts routinely handle Reverse-Erie cases, their decisions do not
shed particularly helpful light on the subject.92 And in cases where state
courts have either recognized or discussed the issue, they have tended to

83. Oliveri, supra note 16, at 1378.
84. See infra; See also Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 101 (“At various
times, the Supreme Court appears to have chosen among . . . different models in
order to resolve the converse-Erie question, albeit without expressly recognizing
those differences.”).
85. See Clermont, supra note 54, at 2 n.5 (summarizing the literature as of
2006).
86. Compare, e.g., id. at 23–27 (describing a split between two interest
balancing theories: pre-emption and judicial choice-of-law), with Oliveri, supra
note 16, at 1378–83 (describing a split between two choice of law presumptions:
pro-federal and pro-forum).
87. See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures,
110 YALE L.J. 947, 976–83 (2001). And, within discussions of conflict-of-law, both
“interest analysis” and “sovereignty” principle language are common. See, e.g.,
id. at 979, 984.
88. See, e.g., id. at 958–63.
89. See Clermont, supra note 54, at 5 (noting that many scholars often start
their discussions of Reverse-Erie with a pre-emption analysis).
90. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State
Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1784 (1992).
91. 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see, e.g., Reza Dibadj, From Incongruity to Cooperative
Federalism, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 845, 874 (2006).
92. See Clermont, supra note 54, at 29 n.134 (“There are literally millions of
state cases applying reverse-Erie, because the choice-of-law issue is ubiquitous.
But most such applications are intuitive. Few cases shed light on the appropriate
methodology.” (citations omitted)).
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defer to Supreme Court precedent.93 Therefore, the best indicator of the
state of Reverse-Erie at the moment stems from the scant occasions on
which the Supreme Court has addressed the doctrine.
So what do we know about Reverse-Erie? As a preliminary matter,
the Reverse-Erie question is premised upon the pre-existence of relevant
federal procedural law.94 Based upon this foundation, scholars have
divided Reverse-Erie into two broad categories.95 The first category is
simple. Whenever the Constitution, Congress (either explicitly or
implicitly), or a federal court mandates that a certain federal procedure
must be used when adjudicating a federal substantive claim, a state
court is bound to apply that particular procedure.96 The second ReverseErie category, on the other hand, is much more complicated. When the
Constitution, Congress, and the federal courts are silent on which
federal procedure accompanies a federal right, which procedure—
federal or state—must a state court use when it adjudicates the federal
right? It is the answer to this second question with which this Note is
concerned and towards which the Alaska court system and all state
court systems similarly situated should turn a watchful eye.
B.

The Theories

The relevant Supreme Court cases, unfortunately, do not provide a
clear answer to this second question. In fact, at times the theories they
posit contradict. But by applying a source test—asking whether the
procedure originated internally or externally to the substantive federal
claim—the case law can be sorted into two relatively clear categories,
each espousing a different Reverse-Erie theory. From these theories it is
possible to give predictive value to the Reverse-Erie doctrine.97 It is

93. Id. at 28–29; see, e.g., Bowman v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 142 N.E.2d 104, 114 (Ill.
1957).
94. Clermont, supra note 54, at 11.
95. See, e.g., id. (dividing the analysis into two “questions”); Oliveri, supra
note 16 (dividing the analysis into two “situations”); Redish & Sklaver, supra
note 81, at 100–01 (dividing the analysis into two “questions”).
96. Clermont, supra note 54, at 20. Of course, this is true only if the federal
procedure is constitutionally valid. Id. Intriguingly, an argument could be made
that Twombly is just this sort of federal court mandate with regard to antitrust
claims, and therefore that state courts must apply the heightened pleading
standard in those cases regardless of state procedural law. But this Note will not
address this possibility, instead focusing on only the broader question of
whether Alaska’s pleading standard would have to yield to the new federal
standard generally, rather than in some specific subset of cases.
97. The Reverse-Erie literature has been, in large part, a search for
predictability. Scholars have lamented the inherent unpredictability of balancing
tests with unknown methodology. E.g., Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 104.
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unclear, however, which theory predominates.
The first category of Reverse-Erie cases presents what this Note
terms the “internal-source theory.” In this category, a strong
presumption exists in favor of the application of federal procedure in a
state court adjudication of a federal substantive claim only when the
procedure exists within the federal substantive claim’s text, purpose, or
legislative history. If the federal procedure does not originate from
within the substantive claim, then the lex fori, the law of the jurisdiction
adjudicating the claim, applies. It is within this group that the “general
[conflict-of-law] rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of
state control of state judicial procedure, . . . that federal law takes the
state courts as it finds them”98 finds purchase.
Practically, this is accomplished through a narrow conflict preemption analysis, utilized to pre-empt state rules only when explicit
indications of congressional intent are present. Justice O’Connor is a
strong advocate of this view. In her dissent in Felder v. Casey,99 she
exclaimed, “without some compellingly clear indication that Congress had
forbidden the States to apply such statutes in their courts, there is no
reason to conclude that they are ‘pre-empted’ by federal law.”100
Interestingly,
the
Court
engages
in
this
conflict-of-laws
substance/procedure dichotomy only to describe the situations where
pre-emption is not applicable.101 There is also a safety valve. The cases
hint, albeit cryptically, that the requirement to apply federal procedure,
when it exists, may yield when the imposition of the federal procedure
would force a state’s judicial system to undergo unduly burdensome
changes.102 Cases in this category include Central Vermont Railway Co. v.
White,103 Felder, Howlett v. Rose,104 and Johnson v. Fankell.105
The second category of Reverse-Erie cases presents what this Note
terms the “external-source theory.” Here, the Court applies a balancing
test to determine the application of federal procedure when a state court

98. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489, 508 (1954).
99. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
100. Id. at 157 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373 (1990) (using this language to
refer to the other state procedural rules that the Court did not pre-empt).
102. See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363–64
(1952) (noting that, had Ohio abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases, then
perhaps the Court would not have forced the state to hold a jury trial in the
negligence case before it); see also Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 103–04
(analyzing Dice).
103. 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
104. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
105. 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
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adjudicates a federal substantive claim, even when the procedure
originates outside of the text, purpose, or legislative history of the
substantive claim.106 This balancing test is weighted in favor of keeping
federal substantive claims and federal procedures together. It is unclear,
however, how rebuttable or strong this presumption is as the reasoning
behind the imposition of federal procedure has varied from case to
case.107
Unlike the internal-source theory, the external-source theory is
marked by its minimal reliance on pre-emption and heavy use of
alternative theories to justify the application of federal procedure in
state court.108 For example, it is not uncommon to see the Court frame
the problem entirely in conflict-of-law terms, tracking the general
conflict-of-law principle that “a forum state may apply its own
procedural law to all rights of action that it enforces.”109 Whereas the
Court will mirror this language when it follows the internal-source
theory, it uses it in an opposite way. Under the internal-source theory,
this language is invoked to describe the situation when the state
procedural rule at issue is not pre-empted. Conversely, the Court under
the external-source theory will usually reclassify the state procedural
rule at issue as substantive and then use the conflict language to preempt it. Here, the Court will refer to the state procedure as “too
substantial a part of the rights . . . to permit it to be classified as a mere
‘local rule of procedure’,”110 or reclassify the rule as “part of the very
substance of his claim [that] cannot be considered a mere incident to a
form of procedure.”111 This reclassification language, commonly found
in conflict-of-law cases, tracks the external-source theory regardless of
whether the rule is mentioned in the text, purpose, or legislative history
of the claim in question. Cases in this category include Central Vermont,
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,112 Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,113
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railraod Co.,114 Felder, and Johnson.

106. See generally, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (applying a
federal procedure that originated outside of the substantive federal claim).
107. Compare Johnson, 520 U.S. 911 (avoiding imposing federal procedure in
the face of a weak federal interest and strong state interests), with Brown, 338 U.S.
294 (imposing a federal procedure because the state procedure would “burden
federal rights”).
108. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361–62
(1952) (relying heavily on conflict-of-law reasoning).
109. Bellia, supra note 87, at 978.
110. Dice, 342 U.S at 363.
111. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942).
112. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
113. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
114. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
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Note that Central Vermont, Felder, and Johnson are included in both
the internal- and external-source-theory-case lists. That is because these
three cases contain strands of both internal- and external-source
theories. The Supreme Court, in these cases, gave multiple reasons for
its decisions without selecting a predominant theory—a fact that
exacerbates the confusion associated with Reverse-Erie. Because of this,
the portion of the opinions positing the internal-source theory will be
discussed along with the other internal-source-theory cases, and the
external-source-theory portions will be discussed with the other
external-source-theory cases.
It may be tempting to see the internal-source theory merely as
dealing with pre-emption and the external-source theory merely as a
manifestation of conflict-of-law principles. Indeed, if that were true,
there would be no need to reclassify these theories into these newly
termed categories. But the reality is not that simple. Both theories
incorporate bits of the other—the internal sometimes using a balancing
approach and the external occasionally venturing into pre-emption
territory. In both internal- and external-source-theory cases, the various
underlying principles at work combine to form a single Reverse-Erie
understanding. Describing both internal- and external-source theories as
merely the individual parts that form them would therefore be
confusing and ultimately unhelpful. Instead, the reclassification of the
Court’s grouping of underlying principles under new headings in the
hopes of providing clarity and predictability in the Reverse-Erie debate.
1.

Internal-Source-Theory Cases
a.

Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White—1915

In 1915, the Court decided one of the earliest Reverse-Erie cases,
Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White.115 Central Vermont provides a
cutaway glimpse into the inner-workings of a nascent Reverse-Erie
theory. Indeed, this case contains early strands of both internal- and
external-source theories. As such, it is a helpful starting point on which
to base this analysis.
On January 12, 1912, Enoch White, a brakeman for the Central
Vermont Railway Company, was killed when a faster moving train on
the same track hit his train from behind.116 Moments before the accident,
the faster moving train was given a clearance card by the railway
company “indicating that the track ahead was clear and that it might

115. 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
116. Id. at 509–10.
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proceed.”117 White’s widow, the administratrix of his estate, sued the
railway company in Vermont, under the Federal Employers Liability Act
(FELA),118 for negligence.119 The case centered on the question of which
party should bear the burden of proof for contributory negligence.120
Under Vermont state law, the plaintiff bore the burden of proof.121
Federal law, in contrast, placed the burden of proof upon the
defendant.122 The text of FELA was silent as to burden of proof.123
Oral argument in the Supreme Court was devoted to the question
of which law applied.124 The railway argued that because the law at
issue was procedural, the lex fori (law of the forum) must apply.125
White’s estate argued that because the suit arose under FELA, a federal
law, federal procedural law must apply.126 Resolving the issue, the
Supreme Court applied the federal procedural law.127 The Court’s
explanation, however, was opaque. The Court declined to select
between the two separate lines of reasoning it supplied. The argument
discussed here tracks the internal-source theory. The Court’s externalsource-theory argument is discussed in the next Section.
In relevant part, the Court attacked the case from a conflict preemption point of view.128 When state procedural rules either bar the
remedy or destroy the liability created by the federal substantive law,
the Court commented, then “the law of the jurisdiction, creating the
cause of action . . . would control.”129 The Court’s contention tracks
traditional principles of conflict pre-emption, namely, that state laws are
pre-empted by federal law whenever “under the circumstances of [a]
particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”130 Here, the Court held that “Congress, in passing [FELA],
evidently intended that the Federal statute be construed in the light of
[federal court decisions which] . . . have uniformly held that, as a matter

117. Id. at 509.
118. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012).
119. Cent. Vt., 238 U.S. at 508.
120. Id. at 510–11.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 512.
123. Id. at 511.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 512.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 511.
129. Id.
130. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)
(alterations in original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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of general law, the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the
defendant.”131 Under this conflict pre-emption language, then, federal
law must apply because not applying the rule would frustrate
congressional intent.
This argument reflects the internal-source theory. The Court
applied a narrow conflict pre-emption analysis, limiting its pre-emption
doctrine to only those cases where congressional intent was clear. Note
that the pre-emption analysis is fairly straightforward. Throughout the
twentieth century, however, as both internal- and external-source
theories developed, the Court’s reasoning became more complex,
incorporating more theories into its analysis.
b.

Felder v. Casey—1988

Seventy-three years later, the Court revisited the internal-source
theory. In Felder v. Casey,132 the Supreme Court rejected the view that
state courts take all federal substantive law free of accompanying federal
procedure and may apply their own state procedures.133 On July 4, 1981,
Milwaukee native Bobby Felder was stopped by police officers for
questioning in the midst of a search for an armed suspect.134 During the
questioning, the interrogation turned violent and Felder was beaten and
arrested.135 Nine months later, Felder filed a Section 1983136 claim against
the city of Milwaukee and certain police officers, claiming that his
beating and arrest were both “unprovoked and racially motivated.”137
The police officers quickly moved to dismiss Felder’s case, arguing that
his suit failed to comply with Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute, a local
state procedure.138 That statute required that every action against any
state entity include a written notice of the claim within 120 days of the
alleged injury.139 The federal statute, Section 1983, contained no such
notice-of-claim requirement.140 The state trial court dismissed the case,
131. Cent. Vt., 238 U.S. at 511–12.
132. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
133. Id. at 137. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had adhered to the strict
procedure/substance dichotomy. See id. (describing the Wisconsin Supreme
Court as reasoning that “while Congress may establish the procedural
framework under which claims are heard in federal courts, States retain the
authority under the Constitution to prescribe the rules and procedures that
govern actions in their own tribunals”).
134. Id. at 134.
135. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
137. Felder, 487 U.S. at 135.
138. Id. at 136.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 140 (“[In the federal system,] the absence of any notice-of-claim
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applying the state procedural rule to the federal substantive claim.141 On
appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while
Congress may establish federal procedure, the states retain the authority
to prescribe the procedure for all substantive actions, federal or state,
brought in their courts.142 The United States Supreme Court reversed
and applied federal procedure.143
The Court relied on two distinct lines of reasoning to explain its
decision to apply federal procedure to the federal substantive claim in
state court. In the first part of its opinion, the Court adopted a conflict
pre-emption analysis coupled with a limited version of the
substance/procedure analysis found in conflict-of-law cases. For preemption, the Court held that “the notice-of-claim statute at issue here
conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of §
1983 . . . .”144 Regarding the substance/procedure analysis, the Court
stated that the “the general and unassailable proposition . . . that states
may establish the rules of procedure . . . in their own courts,” is limited
only to those situations where there exists no pre-emption problem.145 In
the face of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s holding that the only test is
one of substance or procedure,146 the Court commented that “[h]owever
equitable this bitter-with-the-sweet argument may appear in the
abstract, it has no place under our Supremacy Clause analysis.”147
This line of reasoning tracks the internal-source theory almost
exactly. The Court carefully protected federal substantive claims while
deftly leaving room for states to apply their own procedures in certain
situations. Indeed, “[s]tates may make the litigation of federal rights as
congenial as they see fit . . . because such congeniality does not stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ goals.”148 This decision
reflects “a high degree of care and effort” on the part of the Court to
maintain separate spheres of state and federal authority.149
While its pre-emption language is strong, the Court did not yet
appear committed to either theory as the sole source of its Reverse-Erie
jurisprudence. That is because the Court also put forth the more
expansive external-source theory in its opinion, which is discussed
provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the
federal civil rights scheme.” (emphasis added)).
141. Id. at 137.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 138.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 138, 150.
146. Id. at 137.
147. Id. at 150.
148. Id. at 151.
149. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 107.
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below in Part III.B.3.e.
c.

Howlett v. Rose—1990

In Howlett v. Rose,150 another Section 1983 case, the Supreme Court
faced a Florida waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute that prevented
certain Section 1983 cases from being brought in state court.151 Mark
Howlett, a minor and former high school student, sued his school board
and three school officials in Florida state court, claiming, in relevant
part,152 that his former assistant principle made an illegal search of his
car in alleged contravention of Howlett’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.153 The defendants asserted their sovereign immunity
pursuant to Florida state procedure and moved to dismiss the Section
1983 claim.154 As the Supreme Court later noted, a sovereign immunity
defense would not have been available had the case been brought in
federal court.155
The Supreme Court reversed the Florida courts, holding that the
Supremacy Clause pre-empted the application of the state procedural
rule.156 Regardless of whether the rule constituted a substantive or
procedural rule, the Court found that since federal courts had already
interpreted the relevant portions of Section 1983, a state statute was
constitutionally estopped from altering that interpretation:
Since this Court has construed the word ‘person’ in § 1983 to
exclude States, neither a federal court nor a state court may
entertain a § 1983 action against such a defendant. Conversely,
since the Court has held that municipal corporations and
similar governmental entities [like the School Board here] are
‘persons,’ a state court entertaining a § 1983 action must adhere
to that interpretation.157
Even more pertinently, the Court found that Congress, by
including municipalities within the class of persons subject to Section
1983 liability, had already addressed the issue and therefore that the

150. 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
151. Id. at 359–60.
152. Howlett’s claim also included several state law causes of action. Id. at
359. These claims are, however, irrelevant to Reverse-Erie.
153. Id.
154. See id. (describing how Florida’s waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute
did not cover section 1983 claims).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 375.
157. Id. at 376 (citations removed).
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state was pre-empted from altering the congressional act.158
The Court’s decision nicely tracked the internal-source theory.
Indeed, Howlett stands as one of the few pure internal-source-theory
cases. First, the Court cited “the general rule, ‘bottomed deeply in belief
in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, . . . that
federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.’”159 Second, the Court
cited the pre-emption holding from Felder that “states may apply their
own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are
pre-empted by federal law.”160 Third, and most revealing, the Court
committed itself to an understanding of federalism based on the
internal-source theory. “These principles,” the Court held, “are
fundamental to a system of federalism in which state courts share
responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law.”161
Running through these points, the Court committed itself to only
imposing federal procedure in cases of pre-emption, leaving state
adjudication of federal claims alone. Seventy-five years after Central
Vermont, the Court appeared committed to the internal-source theory as
the sole method of Reverse-Erie analysis. That commitment, however,
did not last.
d.

Johnson v. Fankell—1997

In Johnson v. Fankell,162 the most recent Reverse-Erie case, a
unanimous Court presented both internal- and external-source theories
simultaneously without favoring one over the other. At issue was a
Section 1983 claim made by a liquor store clerk in Idaho against her
former employer, in which she claimed a deprivation of her Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights.163 The clerk’s employers claimed
qualified immunity.164 When their motion to dismiss was denied, they
appealed, treating the denial as an appealable final judgment.165 Had
they been in federal court, it would have been.166 Under Idaho state
procedure, however, the denial of a qualified immunity defense is not

158. Id.
159. Id. at 372 (quoting Hart, supra note 98).
160. Id. (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988)).
161. Id. at 372–73 (emphasis added).
162. 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
163. Id. at 913.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 913–14.
166. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that a
federal court’s rejection of a qualified immunity defense is an immediately
appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012)).
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considered an appealable final decision.167 The Idaho Supreme Court
therefore dismissed the appeal.168 After granting certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.169 For the first and only time
in these cases, the Court put a limit on the intrusion of federal
procedural rules into state court adjudications and refused to pre-empt
state procedure.170
The Supreme Court refused to allow the federal procedure here to
intrude into state court for two primary reasons. The first is discussed
here. The second, an external-source-theory-based reason, is discussed
in the following Section. Here, the Court did not veil its search for the
source of the procedural obligation: “[i]n evaluating [petitioner’s]
contention, it is important to focus on the precise source and scope of the
federal right at issue.”171 The Court noted that the procedure the
petitioners sought did not exist in Section 1983, under which petitioners
had been sued.172 Rather, it existed in Section 1291 of Chapter 28 of the
United States Code.173 “The former right is fully protected by Idaho. The
latter right, however, is a federal procedural right that simply does not
apply in a nonfederal forum.”174 Providing context, the Court cited a
previous holding from Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad
Co.:175 “[i]n that case, however, we made clear that Congress had
provided in FELA that the jury trial procedure was to be part of claims
brought under the Act.”176
This reasoning tracks the internal-source theory. The Court’s
language hinted that, had the appeal of the qualified immunity been
included in the text, purpose, or legislative history of Section 1983,
federal procedure would have applied in Idaho.177 Instead, as the source
of the procedure was Section 1291, a different statute, the state was
under no obligation to enforce it.178 The Court also cited the classic
internal-source theory language that “federal law takes the state courts
as it finds them.”179 Finally, the Court relied heavily on Howlett,

167. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 914.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 923.
171. Id. at 921.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
176. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921 n.12. (citing Dice, 342 U.S. at 363).
177. See id. at 921 (“[I]t is important to focus on the precise scope and source of
the federal right at issue” (emphasis added)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 919 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)).

ARTICLE 6 - TARPLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

THE DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOWS

5/18/2015 2:10 PM

235

described above as one of the few pure internal-source-theory cases, in
this part of its opinion.
Notably, the Court inserted a safety valve into the internal-source
theory. At the very end of the opinion, the Court expressed repulsion at
the thought of displacing fully established state court procedural
systems: “[t]he ‘countervailing considerations’ at issue here are even
stronger . . . . This respect [for principles of federalism] is at its apex
when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to undertake
something as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its
courts.”180 As this comment came at the end of the opinion, it is unclear
to which theory it is supposed to adhere. Most likely, this comment
applies equally to both, reminding scholars that neither theory is black
and white and, like Professor Clermont carefully noted, while preemption plays a big part in the Reverse-Erie analysis, there is always
room for judicial choice-of-law.181
2.

Summary of Internal-Source Theory

As of Johnson, the internal-source theory has survived eighty-two
years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. From this longevity, we can
glean some predictive value. We know that, under an internal-source
theory of Reverse-Erie, the Court is likely to apply a narrow conflict preemption theory, only pre-empting when congressional intent is clear.
Outside of those instances, the Court is reticent to reclassify procedural
rights as substantive and is eager to let state courts apply their own
procedural rules to federal causes of action. This theory is not black and
white, however; a slight balancing test applies. The Court is unlikely to
pre-empt state procedure when doing so would force the state court
system to restructure its procedural rules in a significant way. The
internal-source theory attempts to adhere to strict principles of
federalism and is concerned with the federal/state balance of powers.
3.

External-Source-Theory Cases
a.

Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White—1915

Recall that in Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White,182 a brakeman
for the Central Vermont Railway Company was killed when a faster
moving train hit his train from behind.183 The case centered on the
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 922.
Clermont, supra note 54, at 20.
238 U.S. 507 (1915).
Id. at 509–10.
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question of which party bore the burden of proof for contributory
negligence.184 Under Vermont state law, the plaintiff bore the burden of
proof.185 Federal law, by contrast, placed the burden of proof on the
defendant.186 Crucially, the text of FELA was silent as to burden of
proof.187
Arguing from an internal-source-theory mindset, the Court initially
found that “Congress, in passing [FELA], evidently intended that the
Federal statute be construed in the light of [federal court decisions].”188
These decisions “uniformly held that, as a matter of general law, the
burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant.”189
Using this conflict pre-emption language, the Court held that federal
law must apply because not applying the rule would frustrate
congressional intent.
But the Court also supplied a second, distinct reason for its
holding.190 This second line of reasoning is notable for its minimal
reliance on pre-emption and heavy reliance of conflict-of-laws
principles.191 One important conflict-of-law principle is that “a forum
state may apply its own procedural law to all rights of action that it
enforces.”192 So, with respect to the relationship between federal and
state law, state courts are generally free to apply their own procedural
rules.193 The Central Vermont Court acknowledged as much, saying that
“as long as the question involves a mere matter of procedure . . . the
state court can . . . follow their own practice even in the trial of suits
arising under the Federal law.”194 But the Court reclassified the local
rule in Central Vermont from one of procedure to one of substance.195
This forced the application of the federal rule for contributorynegligence burdens.
This reasoning tracks the external-source theory. While it is unclear

184. Id. at 510–11.
185. Id. at 510.
186. Id. at 512.
187. Id. at 511.
188. Id. at 512.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 511.
191. See id. (“There can, of course, be no doubt of the general principle that
matters respecting the remedy . . . depend upon the law of the place where the
suit is brought.”).
192. Bellia, supra note 87, at 978.
193. See Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151,
158 (1931) (“[T]he procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs
remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control.”).
194. Cent. Vt., 238 U.S. at 511–12.
195. See id. at 512 (“[I]t is a misnomer to say that the question as to the
burden of proof as to contributory negligence is a mere matter of procedure.”).
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whether the Court ultimately adopted the external- or internal-source
theory to decide the case, its reclassification of the local rule of
procedure as a substantive rule hints that it had started to think more in
terms of the external-source theory. And in the Court’s next Reverse-Erie
case, the external-source theory was able to stand alone.
b.

Garrett v. Moore-McCormack—1942

In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack,196 the Supreme Court committed
itself to a purely external-source-theory method of reasoning. There, the
Court handled a Jones Act197 case involving the burden of proof
required under admiralty law.198 In relevant part, the Jones Act is based
upon and incorporates by reference FELA, the substantive federal law at
issue in Central Vermont and that would arise again in Brown v. Western
Railway of Alabama199 and Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad
Co.200 In Garrett, a seaman working for the Moore-McCormack Company
was injured while working on board a vessel traveling between the
United States and Europe.201 Garrett sued in Pennsylvania state court,
claiming his injury was attributable to the negligence of MooreMcCormack.202 Moore-McCormack asserted as a defense the fact that
Garrett had signed a release of all liability.203 Garrett, in turn, claimed
the release was fraudulently obtained.204 In determining the release’s
validity, the Pennsylvania courts enforced a state rule of procedure that
placed the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to invalidate the release.205
In contrast, if the case had been brought in federal court, the burden of
proof would have been borne by the defendant,206 even though the
burden is not explicitly mentioned in either FELA or the Jones Act.207 On
appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether state or federal
procedure applied to Garrett’s claim.
The Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania state courts and

196. 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
197. 46 U.S.C. §§ 50101–58109 (2012).
198. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 240.
199. 338 U.S. 294 (1949); see infra Part III.B.2.c.
200. 342 U.S. 359 (1952); see infra Part III.B.2.d.
201. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 240.
202. Id. at 240–41.
203. Id. at 241.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 242.
206. Id. at 248.
207. See id. at 244 (“The Act is based upon and incorporates by reference
[FELA].”); cf. Cent. Vt. R.R. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915) (commenting on
how FELA does not mention burdens of proof).
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imposed federal procedure on the state court adjudication.208 Oddly, the
Court agreed with the method of state court analysis, though it
disagreed with the ultimate result. Before the case’s appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had applied a
conflict-of-law substance/procedure dichotomy, concluding that state
procedure must apply because of the court’s “belief that the rule as to
burden of proof on releases does not affect the substantive rights of the
parties, but is merely procedural, and is therefore controlled by state
law.”209 In reversing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court retained the conflict-of-law analysis but reclassified the
burden of proof as a substantive requirement.210
The Supreme Court’s (and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s)
reasoning tracked the external-source theory. Because it could not cite a
part of the Jones Act relating to the burden of proof, the Court avoided a
pre-emption analysis, and instead turned to other sources of broad
federal supremacy.211 The Court specifically referred to a desire for
uniform application of federal law, irrespective of local rules of
procedure.212 The Court’s analysis culminated in a reclassification of the
burden-of-proof requirement as substantive.213 The Court therefore
displaced a state rule of procedure not because Congress declared the
burden of proof to be “the very substance of [a Jones Act] claim,”214 but,
rather, because the Court itself did. And once the right was declared to
be one of substance, as opposed to procedure, the Court could freely
impose it on state adjudications.215
c.

Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama—1949

Seven years later, in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,216 the
Supreme Court built on Garrett’s acceptance of the external-source
theory by refocusing the analysis. The Court shied away from the
conflict-of-law principles that it had utilized in Garrett and instead used
a conflict pre-emption analysis to determine which rule of pleading
should apply. What separates this case from those under the internal208. Garrett, 317 U.S. at 243.
209. Id. at 242.
210. Id. at 249.
211. See, e.g., id. at 244 (“[T]his Court has [often] declared the necessary
dominance of admiralty principles in actions in vindication of rights arising from
admiralty law.” (emphases added)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 248–49.
214. Id. at 249.
215. Id. at 245.
216. 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
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source theory and what gives the external-source theory its name is that
here, unlike in Howlett v. Rose217 for example, the federal procedure
originated outside of the federal substantive claim.
In the case, Richard Brown brought a FELA claim against the
Western Railway of Alabama in a Georgia state court.218 The defendant
railway claimed that Brown’s pleading “failed to set forth a cause of
action and is otherwise insufficient in law.”219 Both the state trial court
and state court of appeals agreed with the railway and found Brown’s
claim to be insufficiently pleaded under Georgia’s strict pleading
standards.220 The case was appealed up to the United States Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari because “the implications of the
dismissal were considered important to a correct and uniform
application of the federal act in the state and federal courts.”221 The
Supreme Court, applying federal pleading standards, reversed the state
courts’ decisions and held that Brown’s pleading was sufficient.222
In analyzing the case, the Court made several interesting moves.
The Court first side-steped the conflict-of-law substance/procedure
analysis, saying that the extent to which “rules of practice and
procedure may dig themselves into substantive rights is a troublesome
question” and that its own precedent revealed “the impossibility of
laying down a precise rule to distinguish ‘substance’ from
‘procedure.’”223
Instead of a conflict-of-law analysis, then, the Supreme Court opted
for a broad conflict pre-emption analysis. The Court determined that
Georgia’s pleading standard, which construed all pleadings against the
pleader, burdened the federal right asserted under FELA.224 But the
Court only hinted at what it meant by “burden.” The Court lamented
that failing “to protect federally created rights from dismissal because of
over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings [would
preclude achieving] desirable uniformity in adjudication of federally
created rights.”225 The Court therefore pre-empted Georgia’s pleading
standard not because it was stricter than the federal standard, as some
commenters have argued,226 but rather because the resulting difference in

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

496 U.S. 356 (1990).
Brown, 338 U.S. at 294.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.
E.g., Michalski, supra note 14, at 121.
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pleading standards was undesirable.227
The Court’s decision in Brown provides a helpful look into the
mechanics of the external-source theory. Possibly uneasy with the
thought of reclassifying a pleading rule as substantive, the Court could
not rely heavily on the conflict-of-law approaches in Garrett and Central
Vermont. Yet the Court still had to find some way to protect what it
considered to be desirable uniformity under the newly enacted Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court’s solution was to expand its preemption jurisprudence to include pleading rules. But importantly here,
the federal rule of pleading is neither mentioned in FELA’s text or
purpose. The Court therefore had to look outside the federal substantive
claim to find the procedure it chose to enforce.
The majority’s move did not escape notice. Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson, in dissent, worried what this decision portended for
federalism.228 State courts, they acknowledged, are empowered to hear
federal claims.229 But they argued that, although state courts are
required to implement federal substantive law, they should be allowed
to apply “such structures and functions as the States are free to devise
and define.”230 Moreover, the Justices believed that “if a litigant chooses
to enforce a Federal right in a State court, he cannot be heard to object if
he is treated exactly as [state-law-bringing] plaintiffs . . . with regard to
the form in which the claim must be stated.”231 After all, the plaintiff has
the choice to file his claim in either state or federal court and he chose to
227. See Brown, 338 U.S. at 299 (discussing the federal desire for uniformity).
Professor Michalski’s point that state court systems may not impermissibly
burden federal rights is correct, but that was not at issue in Brown. See Michalski,
supra note 14, at 121 (making this point). Rather, the important issue was one of
uniformity, which the Court explicitly acknowledged. See Brown, 338 U.S. at 295
(stating that the reason certiorari was granted was because “the implications of
the dismissal were considered important to a correct and uniform application of the
federal act in the state and federal courts” (emphasis added)). Three years later,
in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342 U.S. 359, Justice
Frankfurter did address Congress’s purpose in passing FELA in a manner that
would have implicated the strictness of Georgia’s pleading standard, but no
similar discussion of purpose exists in either the majority or dissenting opinions
in Brown. See id. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[Pre-emption would be
valid] only on the theory that Congress included as part of the right created by
[FELA] an assumed likelihood that trying all issues to juries is more favorable to
plaintiffs.”).
228. Brown, 338 U.S. at 299 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Insignificant as this
case appears on the surface, its disposition depends on the adjustment made
between two judicial systems charged with the enforcement of a law binding on
both. This, it bears recalling, is an important factor in the working of our
federalism without needless friction.”).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
231. Id.

ARTICLE 6 - TARPLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

5/18/2015 2:10 PM

THE DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOWS

241

file in state court, “[w]ith full knowledge of the niceties of pleading
required by Georgia.”232
d.

Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.—1952

In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.,233 the last of the
pure external-source-theory cases, the Supreme Court imposed federal
procedure without much explanation. In this short case, John F. Dice, a
railroad fireman, was seriously injured when his train jumped the
track.234 He promptly sued the railroad under FELA in an Ohio state
court.235 As part of its defense, the railroad placed into evidence a release
of liability signed by Dice.236 The Ohio Supreme Court held that, under
Ohio law, whether the release of liability was obtained fraudulently was
a question for the judge, rather than the jury.237 Federal law, in contrast,
required the opposite.238 Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with a
familiar question: should the state or federal procedure apply to the
FELA claim in Ohio state court?
The Court applied federal procedure to the state adjudication.239
“The right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature of our
system of federal jurisprudence,” the Court stated, and as such, is “part
and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under [FELA].”240
The Court considered the right to a trial by jury too substantial to be
considered a mere “local rule of procedure” and, therefore, reclassified it
as a substantive rule. 241
This decision tracked the external-source theory because it avoided
invoking a theory of pre-emption and, instead, reclassified the state’s
procedural rule by heavily relying on conflict-of-law principles.242 While
the Court did not explicitly state it was avoiding pre-emption-based
arguments, there are two features of this case that demonstrate the

232. Id. at 303 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
233. 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
234. Id. at 360.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 361.
238. Id. at 363.
239. Id. at 362–64.
240. Id. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. R.R., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
241. Id.
242. But see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 n.12 (1997) (“[I]n Dice we
held that the FELA pre-empted a state rule . . . .” (emphasis added)). The Court in
Johnson may have been misreading its own precedent, however. See Redish &
Sklaver, supra note 81, at 104 (“At no point in the text of the FELA did Congress
explicitly directed [sic] the state courts to employ the federal practice . . . .”).
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Court’s move was deliberate. First, the Court did apply a conflict preemption theory in one of the other holdings in the same case.243 Second,
the dissent in the case indicates it would have signed onto the majority
opinion had the theory used been one of conflict pre-emption.244
The Court therefore adopted a balancing test in which “the forum’s
interest in employing its own procedures is balanced against the interest
of the source of the substantive law in assuring that uniform policy goals
are attained.”245 The use of this balancing test was highlighted by the
Court’s comment that the state procedure may have survived if “Ohio
[had] abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases including those
arising under the federal Act.”246 The likely inference is that changing
the state’s established and widely-applied procedure would have been
too burdensome for the Court to impose.
But even as the Court affirmed its use of the external-source theory
in Dice, its dissenters grew more numerous.247 Although it would take
thirty-six years, this minority would eventually establish a majority.248
e.

Felder v. Casey—1988

After a thirty-six year period, the Court returned to the ReverseErie theory. Notably, the dissenting opinions that advocated for a
limited pre-emption theory in Brown and Dice finally found themselves
in the majority in Felder v. Casey.249 Unfortunately, the best they could
muster to keep that majority was a compromise. As noted earlier, Felder
utilized both internal- and external-source theories.250 Recall that Felder
involved a Section 1983 claim against the city of Milwaukee and certain
police officers, claiming that the beating and arrest of Bobby Felder were

243. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 362 (“Application of so harsh a rule to defeat a
railroad employee’s claim is wholly incongruous with the general policy of the
Act . . . .”); cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (defining conflict preemption as the application of federal law when state law defeats the purpose
and policy of the federal law).
244. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[Applying federal
procedures would be appropriate] only on the theory that Congress included as
part of the right created by the Employer’s Liability Act an assumed likelihood
that trying all issues to juries is more favorable to plaintiffs.”).
245. Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 104.
246. Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).
247. In Brown, only Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented. Brown v. W.
Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949). In Dice, Justices Reed and Burton joined them.
Dice, 342 U.S. 359.
248. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
249. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
250. See discussion of Felder, supra Part III.B.1.b.

ARTICLE 6 - TARPLEY (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

THE DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOWS

5/18/2015 2:10 PM

243

both unprovoked and racially motivated.251 The police officers moved to
dismiss Felder’s case, arguing that his suit failed to comply with
Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute, a local state procedure.252 That
statute required that every action against any state entity include a
written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury.253
Under federal procedures, Section 1983 contained no such notice-ofclaim requirement.254 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, while
Congress may establish federal procedure, the states retain the authority
to prescribe the procedure for all substantive actions, federal or state,
brought in their courts.255 The United States Supreme Court reversed
and required the application of federal procedure.256
While the Court adopted a view of the pre-emption doctrine
consistent with the internal-source theory, it changed gears in the
middle of the opinion and provided a second reason for its holding. In
this second part of its opinion, the Court adopted an outcomedeterminative-based test. Because “the outcome of federal civil rights
litigation will frequently and predictably depend on whether it is
brought in . . . federal court,”257 the Court did not allow Wisconsin to
apply its own procedure. Mirroring Erie’s desire for vertical uniformity
between state and federal court litigation,258 the Court committed itself
to a broad understanding of federalism: “the very notions of federalism
upon which respondents rely dictate that the State’s outcomedeterminative law must give way when a party asserts a federal right in
state court.”259
This line of reasoning closely resembles the external-source theory.
The Court appears to indicate that a state court adjudicating a federal
law must arrive at the same conclusion a federal court adjudicating the
same claim would have.260 Such a holding leaves little room for state

251. Felder, 487 U.S. at 135.
252. Id. at 135–36.
253. Id. at 136.
254. See id. at 140 (“[In the federal system] the absence of any notice-of-claim
provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the
federal civil rights scheme.” (emphasis added)).
255. Id. at 137.
256. Id. at 138.
257. Id. at 151.
258. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[T]he outcome
of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as
legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State
court.”).
259. Felder, 487 U.S. at 151.
260. See id. at 152. (“Wisconsin, however, may not alter the outcome of
federal claims it chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with
outcome-determinative rules . . . .”).
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courts to apply their own procedure when adjudicating federal claims.261
f.

Johnson v. Fankell—1997

After Felder, the Supreme Court returned to using only the internalsource theory in Howlett.262 The brief clarity accompanying such a
decisive decision was, unfortunately, short lived. Seven years after
Howlett, the Court decided Johnson v. Fankell263 and reintroduced the
external-source theory back into Reverse-Erie jurisprudence by issuing
an opinion relying on both the internal- and external-source theories.
Recall that in Johnson, the substantive claim involved a Section 1983
action brought by a liquor store clerk in Idaho against her former
employers, claiming a deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process rights.264 The clerk’s employers filed a motion for qualified
immunity.265 When their motion was denied, they appealed, treating the
denial as an appealable final judgment.266 Had the suit been brought in
federal court, this would have been appropriate.267 However, under
Idaho state procedure, a denial of a qualified immunity defense is not
considered an appealable final decision.268 Thus, the Idaho Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal.269 The United States Supreme Court upheld
the dismissal.270 While this decision is notable for its limitation on the
intrusion of federal procedure in state court adjudications, its reasoning
reveals that the external-source theory survived its brief abandonment
in Howlett.
The Court supplied two lines of reasoning in Howlett. Addressing
the internal-source theory first, the Court looked for the source of the
federal procedure. As the source of the procedure was in Section 1291, a
different statute, the state was under no obligation to enforce it.271
Intriguingly, however, the Court supplied a second reason for its
decision.
261. The dissent viewed this as a substantial problem with the Court’s
decision. See id. at 161 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s] suggestion
seems to be based on a sort of upside-down theory of federalism . . . .”).
262. See text accompanying the discussion of Howlett, supra Part III.B.1.c.
263. 520 U.S. 911 (1997).
264. Id. at 913.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that a
federal court’s rejection of a qualified immunity defense is an immediately
appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012)).
268. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 914.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921.
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In the second part of its opinion, the Court applied the outcomedeterminative test introduced in Felder and, by doing so, the validity of
the external-source theory. Interpreting the outcome-determinative test
of Felder as requiring the imposition of federal procedure in all cases,
petitioners argued that the federal procedure should apply in this
case.272 The Court, despite acknowledging that the outcome of
petitioners motion would have come out differently in federal court,
rejected petitioner’s specific argument.273 But, in doing so, the Court was
not abandoning the outcome-determinative test—it was simply
clarifying it. This test, the Court explained, is not triggered when just
any decision comes out differently in state court. Rather, “outcome, as
[the Court] used the term [in Felder], referred [only] to the ultimate
disposition of the case.”274
Following this explanation, the Court inserted a safety valve into its
Reverse-Erie
jurisprudence.
Finding
that
“countervailing
considerations” weighed too strongly against the application of federal
procedure in state court, the Court stated that its “respect [for principles
of federalism] is at its apex when [it] confront[s] a claim that federal law
requires a State to undertake something as fundamental as restructuring
the operation of its courts.”275 Reticent to require the state court to
completely change its procedural systems, the Court signaled that its
Reverse-Erie jurisprudence should take into consideration the degree of
disruption in state court.
The fact that, in Howlett, the Court allowed Idaho’s state procedure
to govern does not mean that the external-source theory—or ReverseErie generally—is no longer as robust as it once was. It is important to
remember that the external-source theory is not black and white; it
represents a balancing test.276 It is to be expected, then, that from time to
time the Court will refrain from imposing federal procedure—a fact that
makes the ultimate disposition of the case the least important part of it.
What is important is that the Court’s reference to Felder’s outcomedeterminative theory reveals that it is still willing to entertain externalsource theory reasoning.
4.

Summary of External-Source Theory

Like its internal counterpart, the external-source theory has
272. Id. at 918.
273. Id. at 915.
274. Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
275. Id. at 922.
276. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 2, at 1447 (explaining the Court’s “balancing
[of] the competing sovereign interests, a technique not used in Brown”).
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survived since 1915. Unlike the internal-source theory, which has
remained largely the same since Central Vermont, the external-source
theory has grown and brought new and different principles under its
umbrella. At its very essence, the external-source theory is a broad
interest-balancing test weighted towards keeping federal substantive
and procedural rights together. In this balancing test, the Court weighs
conflict pre-emption, conflict-of-law, and outcome determinative
theories, the federal and state interests involved, and the degree of
disruption pre-emption would cause. With respect to pre-emption, the
Court is willing to look outside the four corners of the substantive claim
involved to find the procedure. Regarding conflict-of-law principles, the
Court is willing, and in fact sometimes eager, to reclassify seemingly
procedural rules as substantive. And the Court has recently reaffirmed
its acceptance of an outcome-determinative approach to Reverse-Erie,
under which the Court is likely to pre-empt any state rule that would
lead to different results in different courts. When the Court weighs
federal interests, it heavily weighs a desire for procedural uniformity.
But the Court has also expressed concern when imposing federal
procedures that would require a state to significantly restructure its
procedural systems. Even so, under the external-source theory, the
Court is much less concerned with principles of federalism and is more
willing to assert federal dominance than it is under the internal-source
theory.

IV. THE ANSWER
This overview of Reverse-Erie reveals a potentially unsatisfying
conclusion. The question posed by this Note asks which set of
procedural rules—federal or state—must apply in an Alaska state court
adjudication of a federal substantive claim when Congress, the
Constitution, and the Courts have not spoken. Unfortunately, there is no
single, clear answer. Even so, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
impose the new federal plausibility pleading standard from Bell Atlantic
Co. v. Twombly277 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal278 onto state courts. Such a move
would likely upset the federal/state balance too much.
The Court would be unlikely to pre-empt notice pleading in state
court under the internal-source theory. To justify such an action the
Court would have to find an explicit pro-defendant purpose behind the
federal substantive claim. Lacking such a purpose, the Court would be
reticent to reclassify the pleading procedure as a substantive right and
277. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
278. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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therefore would not pre-empt the state pleading standard.
While the Court might be more inclined to pre-empt a state’s notice
pleading regime under the external-source theory, it is still unlikely to
do so. The key reason for this is the defendant’s ability to remove a case
to federal court. Should a defendant feel disadvantaged by how easily a
plaintiff could bring a suit against him, he can remove the case to federal
court and take advantage of its heightened pleading standard.279 This
ability provides a compelling and practical reason for the Court to avoid
pre-empting Alaska’s pleading standard.
That said, it is theoretically possible to justify such pre-emption.
Because Iqbal’s plausibility standard increases a plaintiff’s burden for
getting into federal court, as compared to Alaska’s notice pleading
standard, the state’s policy broadly swings pro-plaintiff and the federal
policy swings pro-defendant. But as Justice O’Connor put it, “it should
follow [from Reverse-Erie] that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are
entitled to the benefit of all federal court procedural rules that are
‘outcome determinative.’”280 Taking this position seriously could allow
the Court to impose the federal pro-defendant pleading policy on states,
like Alaska, that would otherwise favor plaintiffs.281
For now, Alaska and the other notice pleading states can breathe
easy. While the possibility exists they will be forced to change their
pleading standards, the probability—and in fact the plausibility—of
such a ruling is very low. Of course, if any state has a desire to change its
procedure, it may do so even without a Supreme Court mandate.282

279. See Chen, supra note 2, at 1450 (“The ability to remove federal cases
significantly reduces forum-shopping opportunities.”).
280. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
281. An example of a similar situation would be a possible implication of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which applies a heightened “particularity”
standard on federal plaintiffs pleading fraud or mistake. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). If a
state let plaintiffs plead fraud or mistake according to Conley’s pro-plaintiff “no
set of facts” standard, in the face of Rule 9(b)’s pro-defendant heightened
pleading standard, could the Supreme Court force the state to adopt Rule 9(b) to
protect its pro-defendant pleading policy? It seems the answer to this question
should be the same as the answer to whether the Court could force the state to
adopt the Twombly and Iqbal standard, which this Note addresses.
282. Although outside the purview of this Note, those interested in the
benefits and pitfalls of voluntary adoption of the federal pleading standard
should look to Carl Tobias’s discussion of the Arizona Supreme Court’s recent
decision to adopt some of the Federal Rules. Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery
Dilemma for the Arizona Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615 (2002).
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CONCLUSION
For the last century, the Reverse-Erie doctrine has hidden in the
shadows of Erie and other monolithic constitutional doctrines. Now, as
states are starting to assert their own local procedural dominance,
Reverse-Erie has a chance to stand again in the light of day. The advent
of plausibility pleading has presented courts across the nation with an
opportunity to re-examine their own pleading standards and procedural
systems. More importantly, it has provided the Supreme Court an
opportunity to apply Reverse-Erie to one of the most essential aspects of
civil procedure: pleading standards.
This Note has demonstrated how the twin theories within ReverseErie have guided Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout the
Twentieth Century. As these theories have competed for prominence,
they have displayed the differing opinions on federalism that exist on
the Supreme Court. Because no definitive decision has been rendered,
there remains ample room for debate on how these theories should be
applied in the future. Whether one of these theories will someday stand
vindicated, the other denigrated as a backwards approach to a bygone
era of federalism, remains to be seen.

